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Abstract
In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the price of
annuities is equal to individuals’ (discounted) survival probabilities. That is,
prices are actuarially fair. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social security
systems invariably allows for cross subsidization between different risk groups
(males/females). We examine the utilitarian approach to the optimum pricing of
annuities and show how the solution depends on the joint distribution of survival
probailities and incomes in the population.
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In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the
price of annuities is equal to individuals’ (discounted) survival probabilities.
That is, prices are ‘actuarially fair’. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social
security systems invariably allows for cross subsidization between di¤erent
risk groups, implyingtransfersfromhigh tolowrisk individuals. Forexample,
most social security systems provide the same bene…ts to males and females
of equal age with equal income and retirement histories in spite of the higher
life expectancy of females.1
We want to examine the utilitarian approach to this issue using the theory
of optimum commodity taxation. Consider a population that consists of H
1Further subsidization is provided when females are allowed to retire earlier.
1individuals. Denote the expected utility of individual h by Uh;h = 1;2;:::;H:
Utilitarianism attempts to maximize a social welfare function, W; which de-
pends on the Uh’s:
W = W (U1;U2;:::;UH): (1)
W depends positively on, and is assumed to be symmetric in, the Uh’s.
Each individual lives for either one or two periods, and individuals di¤er
in their survival probabilities. Let ph be the probability that individual h
lives for two periods; c1h be consumption of individual h in period 1 and c2h
be consumption of individual h in period 2, if he or she is living then. Utility
derived from consumption, c > 0; by any individual in any period during life
is u(c)(> 0): It is the same in either period so there is no time preference.
When not alive, utility is 0. Expected utility of individual h is thus
Uh = u(c1h) + phu(c2h): (2)
The economy has a given amount of resources, R; which can be used in
either period and they can be carried forwards without any gain or loss. With
a large number of individuals, expected consumption in the two periods must






phc2h = R (3)
Maximization of (1) s.t. (3) yields the condition that consumption isequal
in both periods, c1h = c2h = ch; for all h = 1;2;:::;H: Consequently, expected
utility, (2), becomes Uh = u(ch)(1 + ph) and the resource constraint, (3), is
H P
h=1
ch(1 + ph) = R: The First-Best optimum allocation of consumption, ch,




0(ch) = constant; for all h = 1;2;:::;H: (4)
For the case of an additive W, i.e. the sum of expected utilities, condition
(4) implies equal consumption for all: ch = c;h = 1;2;:::;H:
Optimum consumption, satisfying (3) and (4), can be supported by a
competitive annuity market accompanied by an optimum income distribu-
tion. In a competitive (full information) market with a zero rate of interest,
2annuities, i.e. second period consumption, are priced by survival probabili-
ties. Individuals maximizing expected utility subject to a budget constraint
c1h + phc2h = yh h = 1;2;:::;H; (5)
where yh is individual h’s income, choose c1h = c2h = ch =
yh
1+ph: There is
typically a unique allocation of incomes that supports the First-Best, condi-








Accordingly, optimum consumption is equal in all periods and for all




;h = 1;2;:::;H: Optimum expected utility,










A(1 + ph): Hence,
the utilitarian First-Best optimum has inequality in expected utilities and
equality in consumption levels, as pointed out by Arrow (1992). This result
is similar to Mirrlees’ optimum income tax model ( 1971) where individuals
di¤er in their productivity.2 Maximization of the sum of utilities leads to a
First Best allocation that provides higher (expected) utility to those with a
higher capacity to ‘produce’ utility. This result carries over for all general
concave (egalitarian) welfare functions.3
2 Optimum Pricing of Annuities
Governments cannot engage in unconstrained lump-sumredistributions of in-
comes. In contrast, most annuities are supplied directly by government-run
2In Mirrlees’ model with additive utilities, the First-Best has all individuals with equal
consumption and those with higher productivity, having a lower disutility for generating
income, are assigned to produce a higher income and hence have a lower utility.
3In the extreme case, with W = Min[U1;U2;:::;UH]; expected utilities are equalized,





(1 + ph) = constant for all h = 1;2;:::;H: Since utility is concave, this
implies that ch =
yh
1+ph and yh decrease with ph:
3social security systems and taxes/subsidies can be applied to annuity prices
o¤ered by private pension funds. Prices of annuities can thus be used by gov-
ernments to improve social welfare. Although deviations from actuarially fair
prices entail distortions (i.e., e¢ciency losses), distributional improvements
may outweigh the costs.
Suppose individual h purchases annuities at a price of qh. With an income
yh; his or her budget constraint is
c1h + qhc2h = yh, h = 1;2;:::;H (7)
Maximizationof (2) subject to(7) yieldsdemands ^ cih = ^ cih (qh;ph;yh);i =
1;2; and h = 1;2;:::;H: Maximized expected utility, ^ Uh; is ^ Uh (qh;ph;yh) =
u(^ c1h) + phu(^ c2h):
Assume that total subsidies/taxes on annuities must equal zero,
H X
h=1
(qh ¡ ph) ^ c2h = 0 (8)
Maximization w.r.t prices (q1;:::;qH)of W
³














= 0; h = 1;2;:::;H; (9)



















@qh is the price elasticity of second period consumption






@yh is the net social value of a marginal
transfer to individual h through the optimum pricing scheme. Equation (10)
is a variant of the well-known inverse-elasticity optimum tax formula which






The implication of (10) for the optimum pricing of annuities depends on
the welfare function, W, and on the joint distribution of incomes, (y1;:::;yH),
and probabilities (p1;:::;pH).
4For concreteness, let W be the sum of expected utilities. Then
@W
@ ^ Uh =




































Consider two special cases of (13):
(a) Equal Incomes: (yh = y = R
H;h = 1;:::;H:)















It is seen (Figure 1) that optimum pricing involves subsidization (taxa-
tion) of individuals with high (low) survival probabilities.4
(b) yh = y (1 + ph)
This, one recalls, is the First-Best utilitarian income distribution and
since all price elasticities are equal to unity, we see from (13), as expected,
that qh = ph, i.e., e¢ciency prices.
4For Figure 1, it can be shown that
Á
2 < 1:
5More generally, it is seen from (13) that a higher correlation between in-
comes, yh, and survival probabilities, ph; decreases - and possibly eliminates
- the subsidization of high survival individuals. In contrast, a negative cor-
relation between incomes and survival probabilities (as, presumably, in the
female/male case) leads to subsidies for high survival individuals, possibly to
the commonly observed uniform pricing rule.
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